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1 The dual social contract
Even though Somalia was composed of stateless
societies before colonialism and much of the
country has returned to that condition today, it
did and does possess local systems of governance
that provide social order (Leonard and Samantar
2011). With the collapse of the national
government of Somalia that followed the
successful revolution in 1991 against then
President Siad Barre, the commercial centres,
ports and trading routes from which revenues
could easily be extracted fell under the control of
militias organised by former army officers and
their business allies. Although clan governance
had been greatly weakened by Italian colonialism
and was not important (at least among elites) in
the major urban areas, it began to reappear as a
principle of social organisation as Barre’s
government weakened in the 1980s. As the
fighting for territorial control deepened after
1991, all the ‘warlords’ and businessmen came to
base their alliances on sub-clan affiliations. For
example, General Mohamed Said Hersi ‘Morgan’
(who ultimately came to control Kismaayo)
initially was allied with other officers of the
Ogaden sub-clan even though he was Harti, but
ultimately he formed a Harti sub-clan alliance.
Similarly, at the community level people
reinforced their sub-sub-clan affiliations and
relied primarily on their ‘diya-paying’ groups1 to
assure their protection. Even though the elite
level of militia organisation and the community-
level of mutual protection both were based on
segmentary patrilineages, the two did not always
have close relationships. 
We have argued elsewhere (Leonard and Samantar
2011) that the legitimacy of a post-conflict state in
contemporary Africa relies on two social contracts –
one within the community and another between it
and the larger state. Traditionally social contract
theorists (from Hobbes through Rawls) have used
the idea of an imaginary social contract to argue
about when and whether citizens should obey their
state, in other words, whether they should accord it
legitimacy. In contemporary discussions about
Africa, however, the idea of the social contract has
also come to include whether or not people actually
do feel an obligation to their rulers and what they
expect from them in return. The colonial state was
based on the legitimacy inhabitants gave to their
local systems of governance and then the bargain
that was made between that ‘traditional’ order and
the state itself – in other words a dual social
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contract. Mamdani (1996) has highlighted the
importance of this two-tiered system of order in
rural Africa. It is our observation that during periods
of civil violence a similar dual contract is evident in
the urban areas as well, with communities
segregating along ethnic lines and choosing leaders
(who are not necessarily traditional) to enforce
internal order and mediate conflicts with other
groups (see Mushi, this IDS Bulletin). 
A second aspect of local governance beyond the
sub-sub-clan and the diya-paying group is evident
as well among the Somalis – the Islamic Sharia
court. Somalis are gifted traders and devout
Muslims. Throughout the period of their civil
wars they have relied heavily on local Sharia
courts to resolve their commercial and family
disputes. These courts are rooted in the local
community and in Somaliland and Puntland they
are supported by the state/regional government
as well. In the southern and central regions of
Somalia, however, the ‘warlords’ failed to
incorporate either the local elders or the Sharia
courts into a governance order. This double
neglect left them vulnerable to the Islamic Court
Union and its successors when they developed in
the early twenty-first century. The different
strategies and trajectories of Somaliland and
Puntland, on the one hand, and the ‘warlords’ of
the south and centre of the country, on the other,
is the story to which we now turn. (For a full
development of the arguments in this section
and the evidence supporting them, see Leonard
and Samantar 2011).
2 The transitions in Somaliland and Puntland
Somaliland and Puntland followed similar routes
from being ‘liberated’ territories to the
reconstruction of state structures and their stories
have been well told elsewhere (Bradbury 2008;
Mohamed and Nur 2008). Both regions were early
in giving birth to exiled, clan-based movements in
opposition to the Barre government and these
parties quickly assumed local leadership after its
fall in 1991. But the important point in terms of
their ultimate stability and legitimacy is that in
both cases the new systems of governance were
validated and shaped through extensive, locally led
processes of consultation with citizen assemblies of
elders and their representatives (isimo).
Somaliland was proclaimed very quickly as an
independent entity by an assembly of elders
meeting at Burco on 18 May 1991. The
consolidation of its governance structures took
another two years of wide consultation, however.
This led in 1993 to the formal appointment of
sub-clan representatives to a national legislature
and the selection as president of Mohamed
Ibrahim Egal, who had been a prime minister of
Somalia in the 1960s and initially had opposed
Somaliland’s return to separate independence.
The new constitution of Somaliland provided for
a two-house legislature. The ‘upper’, consultative,
house is comprised of the founding leaders and
representatives (isimo) of the elders. The ‘lower’,
dominant, house was initially comprised of
representatives selected by sub-clan assemblies of
elders (who in the case of the Somalis are all
adult males) but is now chosen by election.
The movement that established itself in power in
Puntland had long been led by Abdulaahi Yusuf
Ahmed, who had served in the Somali army
before going into exile. After militarily expelling
an Islamist extremist group in 1992, he became
the dominant figure in the region. The
incorporation of elders into the support base for
his regime came later than in Somaliland,
although it similarly involved extensive
consultations. Puntland declared itself an
autonomous region within the (non-functional)
state of Somalia in 1998 and its Council of
Elders, as the unicameral legislature, confirmed
Ahmed as its president. There was fighting when
Ahmed had his term as president extended in
2001, but the Council of Elders (which is still
selected from the base by local assemblies of
elders, rather than elected) remains a key part of
Puntland’s governance structure. 
The foregoing sketches miss an important
qualification, however, one that speaks still
further to the importance of local governance.
The administrative regions of Sanaag and Sool lie
at the boundary of Somaliland and Puntland and
are contested between them. They were parts of
British Somaliland and on that basis are claimed
by present-day Somaliland. Clan-wise, however,
they are Darood and thus more naturally a part
of Puntland, which also claims them. The
residents of the regions have appointed different
sets of senior elders who separately are accepted
as representatives by each of the two proto-states
(Hoehne 2011). These appointments of isimo are
politicised and influenced by the governments of
Puntland and Somaliland, but their centrality
illustrates both the dependence of local
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Map 1 The regions and polities of the former Somalia
Berbera
The boundaries of the regional polities that have
emerged within Somalia are contested. Somaliland
claims all the territory of the former British colony of
Somaliland. Of this area Puntland claims the eastern
part of Sanaag, Sool and the Buuhoodle district of
Togdheer region.
Puntland 
Somaliland
administration on the elders and their role in
mediating potentially dangerous conflicts
between larger political entities.
The northern regions of Somalia thus clearly affirm
the conclusion (Gundel and Dharbaxo 2006) that 
the traditional leaders in Somalia are not only
the prime force for stability and continuity in
terms of regulating access to pastures, water
and conflict resolution between clans but also,
especially in Somaliland and Puntland, have
been instrumental in establishing relatively
stable structures of governance, jurisprudence
and security.
3 The other Somali transitions
Why was the pattern of state reconstruction in
the south and centre of Somalia so very different
from what we observe in the north? Gundel and
Dharbaxo 2006), whom we have just quoted,
continue:
The traditional structures in South Central
Somalia are different and more composite,
fragmented, weakened and confused than in
the north, for a range of reasons:… [a]
heterogeneous mix of… people… the colonial
experience is different… the dynamics of the
civil war in the south differed as well,
resulting in an equally different impact on the
traditional structures. Hence, the common
attempts to superimpose, or project the well-
described northern traditional structures
upon the societies in the south are wrong.
We submit that this statement is partly correct
while also missing a critical aspect of the sad
political trajectory in the south. It certainly is
true that the capital, Mogadishu (located in
South Central Somalia),2 was such a valuable
commercial prize and had such a diverse clan
demography that there was little prospect that it
could have been handled through the northern
pattern of relatively consensual consultations of
clan isimo and gatherings of elders. But even the
southern port of Kismaayo is no more ethnically
homogeneous or commercially valuable than the
Somaliland port of Berbera and the Puntland
port of Boosaaso. It is true that the inter-riverine
area around Baidoa incorporates intertwined
clans involved in distinct livestock and crop
production systems (with the latter much more
easily disrupted by armed predation). But these
clans had previously evolved complex and
mutually beneficial systems of interdependent
production. The ability of the otherwise very
fragile Transitional Federal Government (TFG)
of Somalia to survive in Baidoa until late 2006
suggests that viable inter-ethnic and inter-clan
understandings were not impossible there. Thus
these demographic and economic factors do not
seem to us to have been absolutely
determinative. 
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Table 1 Attributes of peace initiatives in southern and central Somalia, 1991–2007
No. Region Percentages of participation
Reg. auth. Reg. auth. Islamic Diaspora Interntl Sub-clan 
or pols only Leaders ~
(isimo)
93 ALL 10 48 40 26 5 17 16
28 All ’95–’04 39 32 36 11 7 21
9 Hiraan 11 22 89
8 Mudug and Galguduud 50 50 25 25
5 Shabeele Dhexe 80 20 100 60 60
10 Shabeele Hoose 100
10 Jubba Dhexe 50 30 10
25 Jubba Hoose 76 72 4 36
12 Gedo 100 92 17 33 17 25
14 Bay and Bakool 29 14 43 7 14
We believe that other aspects of the political
history of the south and centre are also
important in explaining its instability and failure
to build effective legitimacy from below. The
military and business leaders there were so
intent on displacing one another and on
extracting the commercial and revenue benefits
that would come from expansion that they
neglected to consolidate their legitimacy at the
base until it was too late.
The evidence for our proposition can be found by
analysing Interpeace’s superb compilation of the
93 local peace initiatives that were undertaken in
the south and centre of Somalia between 1992
and 2007 (Oker and Habibullah 2010). These
accounts demonstrate that the elders in these
regions consistently have been and are deeply
engaged in local governance and in the
negotiation of conflicts between local lineages.
Only in the early 1990s and then again as the
Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) was gaining
strength in the early 2000s did these peace
initiatives have international or regional
government support. Whereas in the earlier and
later periods claimants to regional authority
were involved in 40 per cent of the local peace
initiatives, between 1995 and 2004 they were
engaged with only 32 per cent.
UN peacekeeping (UNOSOM) was involved in
seven of the initiatives in the early 1990s but
international support for local peace initiatives
returned only after 2000 and then only nine
times by a non-governmental organisation
(Interpeace’s Centre for Research and
Dialogue), not directly from any donor or
diplomatic organisation. Similarly there is very
little (if any) evidence that elders were involved
before 2000 in establishing and administering
authority in the various regions of Somalia other
than in Somaliland and Puntland, although they
were central to all of the local peace initiatives.
Prior to the inroads of the UIC and its offshoots
(including al-Shabaab), control of the various
regions was established by former officers of the
army of Somalia (under Siad Barre) in alliance
with businessmen who financed them and took
advantage of the local monopolies over trade
that they provided. These officer–business
alliances appealed to sub-clan loyalties but did
not seek validation from sub-clan elders or senior
traditional leaders in establishing or executing
their authority. 
It is striking that none of the officer–business
alliances in the centre and south of Somalia were
able to survive – not even that of General
Mohamed Farah Aideed, who for 15 years had
control of as many regions as were core to
Puntland or Somaliland and despite his group’s
outlasting the concerted efforts of US forces
under UNOSOM-II to capture him. (He was
subsequently killed in a battle but was succeeded
by his ex-US Marine son.) Aideed was engaged in
only two high-level regional peace initiatives, and
Ali Mahdi, his major competitor, was involved in
only two local ones. Politicians of some type were
engaged in almost half of all the local peace
initiatives, and claimants to regional authority
were involved in 40 per cent. But this is a very
low level of political engagement when one
considers that the peace initiatives all concerned
serious threats to order within a region’s
territory, thus showing considerable neglect of
what Hobbes would have considered the core
responsibility of the state – the security of its
citizens. As we noted above, the largest degree of
involvement by regional authorities was in the
early and late periods, when there were military
challenges to local control. In the interim period
when outside threats dropped, regional leaders
and their representatives concerned themselves
with only 32 per cent of their local peace
processes and thus squandered opportunities to
enhance their legitimacy. 
There is variation between the regions in the
degree of involvement of political leaders in
their peace initiatives. In Shabeele Hoose
(Lower) and Hiraan there was none and instead
all the peace efforts in the first were led by
religious leaders and in the second by the
symbolic traditional heads of lineages (isimo).
On the other extreme, in Jubba Hoose, where
control of the port of Kismaayo was at stake,
there were 19 initiatives in the early and late
periods of conflict and claimants to regional
authority were involved in 58 per cent. Similarly
92 per cent of the peace processes in Gedo
involved the regional leadership. It probably is
no coincidence that Gedo is the region out of
which the Jubba Valley Alliance (JVA) was able
to launch the takeover of the two Jubba regions
(and Kismaayo) in 2001. The JVA then engaged
in a spurt of 13 local peace initiatives in these
two regions after 2005, but by this time the UIC
had already gained considerable strength in the
area. 
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Puntland is similar to the south in having grown
out of the initiative of a warlord who had business
support, but in its case assemblies of elders also
were involved intensively and extensively in
regional governance and it twice even supported
the peace initiatives of elders on its southern
periphery. Both in Somaliland and Puntland these
consultations seem to have given the new
structures of authority a legitimacy and durability
that were lacking in the centre and south. 
Of course ultimately political Islam came to be
the dominant contestant for control in the centre
and south. It has shown the legitimacy and
durability that the officer–business alliances
lacked. The 2006 attempt of Ethiopia (with US
support) to dislodge the UIC ultimately was
unsuccessful. (When Ethiopia abandoned its
attempt, the more moderate Islamists took
leadership of the TFG but the radical al-Shabaab
announced an alliance with al-Qaeda. It may be
that the legitimacy and durability of the radical
Islamists in their areas are not as solid as
Somaliland and Puntland are in theirs, but this is
hard to judge since the international
environment has been hostile to the Islamists and
more accepting of the two polities in the north.)
It also is striking that in the cases in which
external military forces have been able to
dislodge radical Islamists in district capitals, the
Islamists have nonetheless remained effectively
in control in the rural areas. All of this suggests
that political Islam is able to establish deeper
roots in the social structures of the Somalis than
military–business alliances can – unless the latter
have involved elders and traditional senior
leaders. During the period in which the warlords
were neglecting the peace initiatives of elders in
their areas the Muslim Sharia courts were
engaged in their communities in the resolution of
family and commercial disputes and we find them
having been involved with 24 local peace
initiatives (26 per cent of the total). Note too that
in the middle period when the Islamists were
consolidating for a challenge to the secular
authorities, their involvement rose to 36 per cent.
Variation within the south is revealing as well.
Islamic religious leaders participated in all the
initiatives in the Middle (Dhexe) and Lower
(Hoose) Shabeele Regions and 43 per cent of
those in Bay and Bakool. The Hawiye clan
dominates in the former two and the Rahanweyn
in the latter pair and these are the two clans that
now show most allegiance to al-Shabaab. The
early presence of Islamic peace efforts in Bay
Region is particularly striking, as the TFG was
headquartered there until 2006. Despite being
dependent on Bay Region, the TFG leaders and
the regional authorities there showed the lowest
involvement (14 per cent) with local peace
initiatives of any other area in the south and
centre of Somalia.
The preceding analysis has important
implications for the TFG and the prospects for
its successor. The TFG structure of
representation has been based on the cooptation
of ‘warlords’ and traditional leaders whom they
in turn have co-opted. It lacks the deeper roots in
Somali society provided by political Islam’s
incorporation of Imams and by the extensive
consultation with a fuller array of elders that
Somaliland and Puntland undertook. 
4 Conclusions
The economics, demographics and conflicts in the
south and centre of Somalia all were such as to
make the involvement of elders and other local
structures in shaping and legitimating regional
governance more difficult. Elders, sub-clan leaders
and religious leaders were not missing, however.
They were engaged in numerous initiatives to
resolve and bring peace to local disputes. 
Occasionally the international community or
regional warlords and politicians supported these
local initiatives, but usually they were
preoccupied with reconstituting a national
government and who would dominate it. They
focused on fighting, negotiating with and
co-opting the militia leaders and businessmen
who put themselves in contest for national office,
and for the international resources that could be
expected to flow through a government of
Somalia once it was properly constituted.
The consequence was that possibilities for
consolidating regional governments and
legitimating them with their populations were
neglected. After the UN retreated from its early
effort to build decentralised regional
governments up into a national federation,
communities were left to govern themselves.
This gap in local governance was taken up not
only by sub-clan and other traditional structures
but increasingly by Sharia courts as well. By the
time the warlords contesting for national power
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realised that their real opponents were not one
another but the proponents of political Islam the
opportunities to build a counter from below were
lost in most of the country.
It may be that sub-clan elders and lineage leaders
will be able to join with more moderate Islamists
to defeat the radical versions of political Islam in
much, and maybe all, of Somalia. The moral of the
experience of the Somalis is clear, however. In a
conflict country, the social contract that exists
between citizens and their local governance
structures not only does not disappear but becomes
much more critical to the security of those at the
bottom. A primary part of post-conflict
reconstruction must be rebuilding the social
contract between community governance structures
and national ones. In some circumstances local
governance may need to be reformed; not
everything that is ‘traditional’ enjoys the support
of its constituents. But citizens will rebuild and
revalidate the state only from the bottom-up. 
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Appendix Region-by-region histories of political control in the south and centre of Somalia
Mohamed Samantar
The earliest resistance to Siad Barre’s government came from groups in the north of
Somalia – the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF, 1978, Darood clan and
Majeerteen sub-clan) and the Somali National Movement (SNM, 1981, Isaaq clan), which
eventually emerged as the dominant forces in Somaliland and Puntland, respectively.
In the south and centre of Somalia, groups of army officers struggled to displace and then
replace Barre, financed by businessmen seeking monopolistic control of trade (ports, towns
and routes). These ‘parties’ were not originally organised along clan lines, but in response
to Hawiye clan efforts others gradually responded by clan affiliation as well.
Jubba Hoose (Lower)
This region includes the important port of Kismaayo. Initially it was controlled by a group
of army officers who had been close to Siad Barre and were primarily of the Ogaden and
Harti sub-clans of the Darood clan – the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM, 1989). 
At first General Mohamed Said Hersi ‘Morgan’, who was a son-in-law of Barre, was a part
of this group, even though his personal sub-sub-clan was Majeerteen (Harti). Ultimately
Notes
1 Diya groups are made up of about 100 adult
males in a sub-lineage who exact and pay
compensation for torts committed against and
by group members (Lewis 1999 [1961]). Such
use of ascriptive ties for security and advantage
seems common when civil war forces a
breakdown in formal governance structures.
2 See appendix for further detail about these
regions.
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‘Morgan’ broke with the Ogadenis in the SPM, who became the Somali National Front
(SNF, 1991), and his Harti branch of the SPM displaced both the Ogadenis from Afmadow
and the Somali National Alliance (SNA, Mohamed Farah Aideed, Habar Gidir of Hawiye,
1992) from Kismaayo. Morgan and Colonel Ahmed Omar Jees retained control of
Kismaayo through 2001. Morgan’s move against Aideed as well as Jees’s realignment from
the latter to the former occurred in the context of the UNOSOM-II campaign to capture
and defeat Aideed. 
From 2001 to 2006 the Jubba Valley Alliance (JVA, Marehan of Darood and Habar Gidir of
Hawiye) under Colonel Barre Hiiraale had control with the support of the President of the
Transitional National Government (TNG).
In 2006 the UIC took control. (One of the UIC leaders, who eventually became leader of
the [radical Islamist] al-Shabaab faction, was Ahmed Godane. Although he is Isaaq from
Hargeysa, the dominant clan in al-Shabaab is Hawiye.) For a short period after 2007
Ethiopian troops occupied Kismaayo but they were never able to displace the Islamists
from the rural areas. Thus when Ethiopia withdrew al-Shabaab retook the city, which as of
August 2012, has not yet been taken by the Kenyans (who have now joined the African
Union forces in support of the Transitional Federal Government, TFG).
Politicians were involved in UNOSOM’s efforts in the early 1990s to broker peace between
the parties but returned to peace initiatives again only between 2004 and 2006 as the
Jubba Valley Alliance was struggling to counter the UIC.
Jubba Dhexe (Middle)
When Morgan and the SPM controlled Jubba Hoose they also had control in Dhexe, as
Barre Hiiraale and the JVA did after them and then the Islamic Courts Union. There was
no religious involvement with the local peace initiatives. Politicians were involved in half of
the mediation exercises.
Gedo
This is a Marehan (of the Darood clan) area and thus of Siad Barre’s sub-clan. Its SNF
retained control, and then in 2001 under Colonel Barre Hiiraale and the JVA it was able to
extend its control first to Jubba Dhexe and then Jubba Hoose as well. 
The JVA was displaced in all its areas by the UIC in 2006. 
Of the 12 local peace initiatives politicians were involved in 11 (with four coming after
2005) and Muslim leaders in two. 
Mogadishu
As the prize port and capital, this city, between the two Shabeele regions, was the site of
the most intensive and longest violent conflicts. The city came to be divided by a ‘Green
Line’, with Mohamed Farah Aideed (and later, his son, Hussein) and the Somali National
Alliance (SNA, 1992, Habar Gidir of Hawiye) controlling the south and Ali Mahdi and his
faction of the United Somali Congress (USC, 1989, Abgaal and Murasade of Hawiye) the
north, until the TFG was able to establish a foothold in 2007 with the support of troops
from Burundi and Uganda. 
Shabeele Hoose (Lower)
From 1991 to 2006 the region was controlled by the Southern Somali National Movement
(SSNM) party of the Biyomaal sub-clan of the Dir, but in alliance with the USC–Somali
National Alliance (SNA, 1992, Habar Gidir of Hawiye; called SRRC after 2001) of Farah
Aideed, which had control of Mogadishu south of the ‘Green Line’. In 2006 the region
became UIC, then Ethiopian, then al-Shabaab. All of the region’s peace initiatives involved
religious leaders and none involved politicians.
Shabeele Dhexe (Middle)
Extending north from Mogadishu, this region was also controlled by the SNA and Ali
Mahdi, until it was captured by UIC in 2006. It is now under al-Shabaab. All five of its
peace initiatives involved religious leaders and Ali Mahdi played a role in two.
Bay and Bakool
These two regions are the core of crop production in Somalia and also are the area of the
sedentary Rahanweyn clan (Rahanweyn Resistance Army, RRA). The two regions were
briefly controlled by Farah Aideed’s SNA but after he was displaced the two became one of
few areas under the direct control of the TNG, until 2006 when it was overthrown by the
UIC. The RRA was the one party in the region that had some involvement of elders. Six of
the 14 peace initiatives involved religious leaders and four involved politicians. The
Rahanweyn clan (with the Hawiye) have become prime supporters of al-Shabaab.
Hiraan
This area was allied with Ali Mahdi and the USC in Mogadishu and also was part of the
TNG. In this region the group exclusively comprised former military officers, without
business support and was dominated by the Hawaadle sub-clan of the Hawiye. They were
supported by Ethiopia and when Ethiopian forces withdrew the non-Hawaadle minorities
joined al-Shabaab and overthrew them. Ethiopia has now returned to Beledweyne and
re-established the Hawaadle USC in the town, but the rural areas are still al-Shabaab.
There was no support by regional authorities in Hiraan for community peace initiatives.
Galguduud
The region is predominately Habar Gidir of Hawiye and thus support Farah Aideed and
the USC. There is a minority of Marehan (Darood) in the region, but no more than a few
villages supported the SNF. The region fell to the UIC in 2006 but in the dissolution of that
movement it became Al Sunna wal Jamah, which is more moderate and supports the TFG. 
Mudug
This region has more internal divisions than any other, save Mogadishu. The area north of
Gaalkacyo is Majeerteen (of Darood), allied with the SSDF and is a secure part of
Puntland. The south is Habar Gidir (of Hawiye), supported the SNA of Farah Aideed, and
is now controlled by the more moderate Islamists of Al Sunnah wal Jamah. However, the
south-east of Mudug is embroiled in a struggle for control over the resources generated by
piracy and is under secular sub-sub-clans of the Habar Gidir, the Sacad and (in Hobyo) the
Saleeman.
This is the one area in which Aideed was involved in a peace initiative, while Puntland
engaged in three of the eight.
Sources for this appendix (beyond the knowledge of the author) are:
Lewis (1999 [1961]); Mohamed and Nur (2008); http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Factions_in_
the_Somali_Civil_War (accessed 10 March 2012); http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics
_of_Somalia#Clan_structure (accessed 21 April 2012); http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United
_Nations_Operation_in_Somalia_II (accessed 28 April 2012).
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